The spirit of Aelius Donatus must be uneasy of late years; so many scholars have attempted to evoke his ghost. Professor H. J. Thomson professes to see in the additional notes to Servius an image once removed from the true Donatus. ‘The question’, he writes, ‘how far we can assume that the words of Donatus are directly reproduced [in the additions first published by Daniel ] can hardly be satisfactorily answered.’ That Donatus was not the immediate source of D, Thomson (...) endeavours to show from three instances, in two of which we know for certain, either from the Glossaries or from Servius himself, the substance of a part, at least, of the note of Donatus on these passages. In the other the argument rests on the comparative meagreness of the note in the enlarged Servius. In all three cases, according to this theory, we have a rehandling of the D comment. The note on the passage from the Aeneid has already been discussed by Professor Thomson in his study of the Virgil scholia in the Abstrusa glossary. The conclusions reached there are repeated, though perhaps not so positively, in the article under discussion. I hold with Professor Rand that we have in Servius auctus substantially the voice of Donatus, though in a fragmentary form, due to the work of a compiler who, with Servius as a basis, has worked in with more or less success explanatory matter which departed from, or was an addition to, the information supplied by an interpreter who himself derived most of his material from Donatus. (shrink)

Probably few scholars would now doubt that at least the bulk of the matter both of Servius' commentary on Virgil and of the additions to it which were first printed by Daniel descends from Donatus. The problem of these additions has been approached by a number of writers from different directions, and different lines of evidence have been found to converge on one conclusion. An important contribution to the discussion has recently been made by J. J. Savage in a (...) thorough study of the multifarious scholia contained in the well-known Bernensis 165 and some other Virgil manuscripts.1 He shows that some of these scholia go back to a commentary which was fuller than that of Servius, and which moreover was related both to S and to D.2 Other fragments of such a commentary are to be found by those who have the patience to sift the rubbish of the Latin glossaries,3 and also, among other sources, in Isidore, who is all the more useful for his habit of verbal transcription.4 When material of this kind is found, there is a strong temptation to say ‘Here is Donatus,’ and one can hardly doubt that that is where much of it ultimately comes from; but the question how far we may assume that the words of Donatus are directly reproduced can hardly yet be regarded as satisfactorily answered. I have before ventured to doubt whether Donatus was the immediate source of D.5 Professor Rand and Mr. Savage think that he was, that the compiler of SD supplemented S with material which S had not reproduce from Donatus the statement to which S had objected. (shrink)

Sidgwick is usually considered to be a utilitarian, and with good reason. In an autobiographical fragment he tells us that his “first adhesion to a definite Ethical system was to the Utilitarianism of Mill”, and that after a variety of intellectual changes he became “a Utilitarian again, but on an Intuitional basis.” He refers to himself in other works and in letters as a utilitarian, and he was so viewed by his contemporaries. Hence it is understandable that Albee should view (...) The Methods of Ethics as “an independent contribution to the literature of Utilitarianism”, labelling it “the last authoritative utterance of traditional Utilitarianism”, and that almost everyone who discusses the book should agree with this classification of it. Yet Sidgwick did not himself say that the Methods is a defense or a restatement of utilitarianism. On the contrary: he was from the first at pains to disavow any intention of proving a system of morality and to insist that he is presenting only an examination of “the different methods of obtaining reasoned convictions as to what ought to be done which are to be found … in the moral consciousness of mankind generally.” In the “Preface” to the second edition he bemoans the misunderstanding which led critics to suppose that he was “writing as an assailant of two of the methods” he examines. One critic, he complains, thought he was giving “mere hostile criticism” of intuitionism, another “has constructed an article on the supposition that my principal object is ‘the suppression of Egoism’”. Yet a third critic, he remarks dryly, referring to a savage attack by F. H. Bradley, “has gone to the length of a pamphlet under the impression that the ‘main argument’ of my treatise is a demonstration of Universalistic Hedonism. I am concerned”, he comments, “to have caused so much misdirection of criticism”; and he goes on to reiterate his position about the two forms, egoistic and universalistic, of hedonism: “I do not hold the reasonableness of aiming at happiness generally with any stronger conviction than I do that of aiming at one’s own.”. (shrink)

James Madison wrote, 'Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates, every Athenian assembly would still have been a mob'. The contributors to this volume discuss and for the most part challenge this claim by considering conditions under which many minds can be wiser than one. With backgrounds in economics, cognitive science, political science, law and history, the authors consider information markets, the internet, jury debates, democratic deliberation and the use of diversity as mechanisms for improving collective decisions. At the same (...) time, they consider voter irrationality and paradoxes of aggregation as possibly undermining the wisdom of groups. Implicitly or explicitly, the volume also offers guidance and warnings to institutional designers. (shrink)

My object in this paper is to suggest a few reflections on some themes in Bentham's work which others as well as I have noted, without perhaps developing them as fully as might with advantage be done. There will be nothing like full development in the limited compass of what is said here, but what is said may at least indicate possible directions for further exploration. The greater part of the paper will be concerned with the notion of natural authority; (...) but I want to begin by taking a broader, though no doubt rather superficial, view of the role in Bentham's thinking of the concepts of ‘nature’ and ‘the natural’. (shrink)

This additional volume offers a revised edition of Lingua , Erasmus’ work on language, its possibilities and the dangers in its use, ending in a praise of the Word of God. Since it deals with the moral implications of language, Erasmus placed it in Ordo IV that comprises works on moral issues.

The object of this article is to examine, with the work of Jeremy Bentham as the principal example, one strand in the complex pattern of European social theory during the second half of the eighteenth century. This was of course the period not only of the American and French revolutions, but of the culmination of the movements of thought constituting what we know as the Enlightenment. Like all great historical episodes, the Enlightenment was both the fulfilment of long-established processes and (...) the inauguration of new processes of which the fulfilment lay in the future. Thus the seminal ideas of seventeenth-century rationalism realized and perhaps exhausted their potentialities in the eighteenth-century Enlightenment. The ideas with which this article is concerned, however—conveniently grouped and labelled as the ideas of utilitarianism—only began to achieve systematic development in these later decades of the eighteenth century. Within that period—during the first half and more of Bentham's long life—attempts to apply those ideas to the solution of social problems met largely with failure and frustration. Yet unrealized potentialities remained, the realization of which was reserved for a time when the world of the philosophes no longer existed. The movements for social and political reform which have played so large a part in modern history since the French Revolution may be judged in widely differing ways; but whatever the verdict, these movements surely cannot be understood without due consideration of that part of their origins which lies in eighteenth-century utilitarianism. (shrink)